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Abstract: Informal logic, is faced with the problematic of persuasive arguments in contexts where evidence is rich, 
diverse and preferentially selected on the basis of pre-established attitudes. This requires that the standard view of 
challenge by presenting inconsistent evidence be rethought. In this paper, I will argue that the solution is to focus 
less on evidence that contradicts claims and to confront the network of warrants that support the selecting and 
evaluating of evidentiary moves.  
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1: Introduction 
 
Informal logic, is faced with the increasing problematic of persuasive arguments in contexts 
where evidence is rich, diverse, inconsistent and preferentially selected on the basis of pre-
established attitudes. This requires that the standard view of challenge by presenting inconsistent 
evidence be rethought. In this paper, I will argue that the solution is to focus less on evidence 
that contradicts claims and to confront the network of warrants that support the selecting and 
evaluating of evidentiary moves. This requires a closer look at networks of commitments and 
how we might evaluate them in terms of their increasing adequacy over time. I will indicate the 
contour of such a framework and support its plausibility by indicating its relations to recent 
attempts to offer neurologic models of belief maintenance as well as to successful scientific 
practice. 
My account offers a relatively straight-forward set of criteria for the acceptance of warrants 
within a network of commitments: increasing adequacy over time in terms of practical 
applications; increasing applicability to a growing body of successful applications; and 
increasing theoretic adequacy in terms of the connectedness of warrants through deep 
explanations. The model is based on physical chemistry, a paradigm rarely employed in 
discussions within informal logic, and which, perhaps surprisingly, resonates with recent 
speculative accounts of cognitive functioning at the neural level, construed in terms of neuro-
physiology, and within formal models and computer simulations of cognitive processes.   
 
2. Setting the problem 
 
Before I can begin, however, I have to face the fact that I have been arguing substantially for 
this position for decades with little apparent success (Weinstein, 1990). And so, I will attempt to 
offer a few hopefully persuasive remarks to induce interest in what follows. Perusing the New 
York Times over the space of a few days yields a variety of examples the illustrate the problem of 
evidence. Paul Krugman, Noble Prize-winning economist in an op ed rails against the economic 
positons of some presidential candidates, calling them “zombie idea- ideas that should have been 
killed by evidence, but just keep lurching along” (Krugman, 2020, p. 22). As an example, he 
cites that financial crisis of 2008, claiming that ‘the erosion of effective financial regulation’ was 
the clear cause of the crisis rather than the view of some candidates for president that the crisis 
was caused by “forcing innocent bankers to lend money to people of color” (ibid.). Clearly, both 
of these claims may be considered reasonably appropriate evidence supporting claims about the 
cause of the financial crisis, and equally clearly the evidence does not in any way resolve the 
dispute as to which point of view is a ‘zombie.’   
An equally fraught debate, resurfacing after many years, is the debate over phonics as the 
basis for reading instruction in schools. Another New York Times feature article discusses the 
“debate between proponents of the ‘science of reading,’ which emphasizes phonics, and 
traditional educators who prefer to instill a love of literature” (Goldstein, 2020, section A, p. 1). 
This recent discussion contrasts the “eye-tracking studies and brain scans now show that … 
Learning to read, they say, is the work of deliberately practicing how to quickly connect the 
letters on the page to the sounds we hear each day” with the view that “blame low student 
performance on such factors as inexperienced teachers, school funding inequities and homes that 
lack books or time for parents to read to their children… (opting for) assigning more challenging 
literature … early-morning, after-school and Saturday tutoring sessions for students at risk of 
failing state tests… The guardians of balanced literacy acknowledge that phonics has a place. 
But they trust their own classroom experience over brain scans or laboratory experiments, and 
say they have seen many children overcome reading problems without sound-it-out drills. They 
value children picking books that interest them and worry that pushing students into harder texts 
could turn them off reading entirely.” (ibid.) This debate, continuing for decades, seems 
impervious to the growing body of evidence from cognitive science, in the face of deep 
conviction about the ethical and cultural value of reading instruction that reflect the differing 
social, cultural, racial and economic perspectives of the interlocutors. 
It is not only complex economic and educational issues that resist a simple appeal to 
evidence. In yet another recent op ed a mathematics professor discusses the difficulties of 
calculate the death rate of coronavirus, despite the apparent hard data available in both the test 
for the disease and the apparent indisputable facts of mortality and the clarity of the math 
(number of deaths over the number of cases). He indicates that “the corona virus might be 
blamed for the deaths of vulnerable people especially seniors already suffering from other 
diseases” and so the numerator (the number of deaths) is harder to determine than counting dead 
people with the virus. The denominator (the number of people with the virus) is also difficult to 
ascertain since “those being treated without being formally tested” might alter the total number 
of the people infected with the disease” (Paulus, 2020, p. 23). And, additional evidence will not 
settle the issue, since until the pandemic is over (if then), all extrapolations from available data 
are based on models, and models are only as good as their warranting assumptions. 
It seems obvious to me that in these debates, as in debates about gun-control, abortion, 
affirmative action and many other significant issues that reflect crucial social concerns, it is not 
the evidence per se that is the issue, but the underlying commitments that determine which 
bodies of evidence to develop, to rely on and to prioritize. So why does so much of the inquiry 
within the informal logic community persist in using models of argument analysis that fail to 
capture the complex informational commitments of advocates in opposing sides? That is, why is 
the focus on relatively abstract structures (e.g. argument diagrams) rather than the adequacy of 
the elements that the structures expose? My guess is that it is the influence of formal logic 
(argument diagrams often reflect propositional logic functions, conjunction, disjunction and 
contradiction) and the need to have something relatively clear and simple to teach. 
My suggestion over many years and many papers is that the analysis and evaluation of 
arguments requires a focus on warrants. But the adequacy of warrants, whether construed as 
generalizations or inference tickets, shifts the focus from evidence to the commitments through 
which evidence is selected, organized and applied. Concern with warrants moves the analysis of 
argument into a subject-matter dependent stance that is uncomfortable for theorists still 
committed to following the paradigm drawn from formal logic, which looks to subject neutral 
and information free tools of argument analysis; tools that privilege logicians rather than subject 
matter specialists in evaluating argument (Weinstein, 2003). 
Surprisingly, my inability to convince others of my point of view is to be expected given my 
perspective. Informal logicians are deeply committed to a theoretic and educational project that 
relies on clear and simple analyses of all sorts of argument, and so, it should be of no surprise to 
someone holding my perspective that they would be resistant to any approach that calls into the 
question the roots of their endeavor. And so, I need to go into the logical roots, the theory of the 
logical basis of argument in the structure of the two sorts of propositions that are the root 
metaphor for the logical process of evidence in its dialectical role. 
The basic form of a proposition can be characterized as Fa, where a is an individual 
expression and F indicates a property. The simplest relevant form of a proposition that functions 
dialectically in relation to Fa is (x)Fx normally translated as: All x are F. The dialectical 
function of the pair is seen as the contradictory expression not-Fa normally construed as 
contradicting (x)FX. The form of a correlative generalization is, e.g. (x) (FX ⊃ GX) and the 
correlative contradictory evidence is (Fa & not-Ga). That much is so obvious that it hardly bares 
mentioning, but yet, if I am correct it is at the heart to the issue. For the obvious construction 
masks two deep and perplexing problems when we move from, for example, arithmetic, which 
was at the heart of formal logic as it was developed in the first decades of the 20th century, to the 
concerns of informal logicians. For in ordinary contexts both the extension of the predicate F, 
and the domain of the universal quantifier are neither clear nor obvious. This first thing to realize 
is that except for bounded predicates, such as the coins in my pocket, extensional definitions of 
common terms and noun phrases are not available, since common nouns apply to all instances, 
past, present and future. But, although people have enough sense of the meaning of terms in use, 
it has hard to defend the view that intensional definitions of predicates are available, if by that we 
mean giving clear necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of common terms. Starting with 
Quine’s seminal insights (Quine, 1953) and reflected in the work of more recent theorists who 
struggle with the problem of semantic meaning as readily available from practice (Alexander & 
Weinberg, 2007) the availability of adequate accounts of meaning in use seems questionable. 
This is, perhaps, controversial within informal logic since the availability of definition and their 
use in distinguishing analytic and synthetic generalizations is generally accepted in the informal 
logic literature (e.g. Freeman, 2005, pp. 97ff.). But surprisingly, if we look beyond mathematics, 
where meaning is clear, to a near relative, the disciplined use of generalizations in physical 
science, the situation is much more complex than it might first seem to informal logicians who 
think that meanings are both obvious and available. This requires a detour into an area that has 
been the focus of my recent work, the history of physical chemistry and its contrast with both 
mathematics and the ordinary sense of predicates, the latter best exemplified by the Aristotelian 
notion of natural kinds (Weinstein, 1999). 
3. Meaning in science: 
 We begin with an example: Prout’s hypothesis, a corner stone of the periodic table and, in 
1817, and a bold and ultimately fruitful conjecture. Expressed in its simple propositional form: 
All elements are composed of hydrogen atoms. The vicissitudes of just what we might mean by 
‘element’ and by ‘hydrogen atom’ was reflected in the complex status of the available evidence 
and underlying theories through which the conjecture was to be verified. The evidence that 
prompted the conjecture was an outgrowth of a deep explanatory principle in early atomic 
theory, that is, that atoms of elements could be described in terms of whole number multiples of 
a primordial atom. This was itself based on both the underlying intuition of atomic theory in its 
original form (that atoms, being indivisible, would only enter into combination as discrete 
individuals) and a growing body of evidence showing whole number ratios among the 
experimentally ascertained weights of naturally occurring substances after chemical 
decomposition. This led to the correlative theoretic notion of atomic weight as an overlay of the 
empirical results of measuring weights on increasingly sensitive balances. Unfortunately, in 
1825, the noted chemist Jacob Berzelius “compiled a set of improved atomic weights the 
disproved Prout’s hypothesis” (Scerri, 2007, p. 40). Prout’s hypothesis remained inconsistent 
with the evidence for at least a century. Nevertheless, Prout was correct in seeing hydrogen as 
the basis of the elements, since hydrogen with one proton serves as the basis as we move across 
the periodic table, each element adding protons in whole number ratios based on hydrogen with 
one proton. The core insight remained at the center of later work that strove to develop coherent 
chemical models based on multiples of fundamental elements. Problems with anomalies 
persisted despite the fact that the number of protons yielded the final organizing principle of the 
table. These were finally resolved, once atomic number, distinguished from atomic weight, 
which includes the contribution from neutrons unknown until the mid-20th century, finally 
vindicated Prout’s bold conjecture. All of this was based on warrants that supported inferences, 
and appear to function inferentially as universal generalizations. Generalizations sustained in the 
face of counter-evidence, forming the basis for a sustained and successful research program 
(Weinstein, 2011). In other words, the definition of the relative terms evolved as the evidence 
prompted reconsideration of development of underlying theories. That is say, meaning was not a 
priori, but rather the result of the development of a network of concepts and generalization. in 
terms of which meaning was refined. This raises another foundational concern. What is the 
meaning of the universal quantifier in such a context of inquiry? 
  In the traditional logic of categorical propositions the meaning of ‘all’ is seemingly non-
controversial, tied to the underlying ontology. Given Aristotle’s views that essential definitions 
of natural kinds were there to be found, there was some sense of defining ‘all’ in relation to the 
philosophical ideal (Weinstein, 2002). ‘All men are mortal’ takes ‘men’ to be definable in 
principle, so it is not much of a stretch to think that ‘all’ can be sensibly seen to range over the 
class. In recent times the centrality of arithmetic in the foundational work in logic, and 
eventually the Skolem-Lowenheim theory (every consistent model had a model in the natural 
numbers) offered an even firmer basis for universal quantification. The definition of the natural 
numbers was clear in terms of Peano’s axioms and the definition precisely characterized the 
domain. Quantifying over all of the numbers was both intuitive and furnished powerful logical 
tools e.g. mathematical induction. But whether we focus on predicates, as is natural in the 
syllogism, or focus on the domain, as in first–order logic, what it means to universally quantify 
over expressions in even as stable an inquiry as physical chemistry is none to clear. At no stage 
in the inquiry can the range of concern be precisely stated, since the task of inquiry is to find out, 
among other things, what is there and how, and to what extent, the available theory comports 
with what is to be found. Since in physical chemistry there is no way to delimit the domain there 
is no extensional definition of the domain, so the arithmetic paradigm, as the guiding intuition on 
the semantics of first order languages, has no purchase what so ever.  
Less obvious perhaps, is the fact that there are no clear intentional definitions. In the 
early stages of the history of chemistry, when the fundamental principles that were to 
permeate the developing science were laid down, the extent of the elements was 
unknown. The prevailing notion of decomposition into elements through chemical means 
was in its childhood, if not its infancy, and there was no reason to believe in the adequacy 
of any available conception of what the elements were. Progress was expected and 
changes in basic concepts welcomed in the face of empirical advance. Philosophical hand 
waving about all possible elements, or about where we would end up in the long run 
gives small comfort. And so, to put the point boldly, if the domain is not determinable, 
the universal quantifier is not logically defined. In such a situation, it seems reasonable to 
say that ‘all’ is a vague statement of hope and intention and leave it at that. But that 
leaves us nowhere, for without some idea as to how generalizations comport with their 
evidence, no logic of science is possible. And yet throughout the history of physical 
chemistry, generalizations were made and functioned logically in terms of confirmation 
and contrary evidence. To understand the logic of all of this is essential to understanding 
argumentation in inquiry, and perhaps this may offer some connection with the new 
possibilities that modern logic provides. 
Science when sufficiently mature and theoretical, as in physical chemistry, requires 
clear and often mathematical theories. In such formal theoretic contexts, as in mature 
scientific theories, predicates often refer to an unbounded, yet definable domain as 
specified by the theory. That is to say that within a theory predicates are given clear and 
explicit definitions in respect of an equally explicit domain of theoretic entities, and so 
‘all’ makes clear sense as applying to the entire unbounded range of possible instances. 
That is, science, like mathematics, takes ‘all’ seriously. But when the theory reaches out 
to reality, to the models of data, which stand as its confirmatory basis, such clarity is 
often obscured by the empirical facts. For although experimental data is interpretable in 
terms of the theory and its predicates, the world has something to say about the specifics. 
This is required for the theory to be empirical, that is, falsifiable.   
The history of theoretic generalizations in relation to their empirical database, 
however, is not the simple one of refutation by experimental counter-example as in the 
classic view of Karl Popper (1963). Theories often resist anomalous data in light of the 
robustness of the theoretic contexts within which the interpretation of empirical data 
occurs. Theories are subject to modification or even disconfirmation in light of 
recalcitrant facts, interpreted within the domain and predicates of the theory, which fail to 
support its theoretic generalizations. But empirical data may also be resisted in the name 
of the power of the theory, measured by its over-all empirical basis, and as important, its 
place in a network of other theories, each of which is supported by its own empirical 
basis and its place in the network of related theories. It is this give and take between 
theoretic embeddedness on the one hand, and risk of modification or falsification in light 
of recalcitrant empirical data that the discussion of Prout’s hypothesis was intended to 
illuminate. Such an account explains how counter examples are to be considered on their 
merit, rather than serving as automatic refutations as in standard logic or in the view of 
those who followed Popper in philosophy of science.  
What I have to offer in place of the simple model of conjecture and refutation is 
three intuitive parameters, drawn from the history of physical science that enable a 
reasonable estimation of the strength of a generalization and its correlative ability to 
withstand counter-evidence (Weinstein, 2009). Physical chemistry exhibits an 
explanatory structure that includes three highly intuitive epistemological properties: 
consilience, breadth and depth, all viewed over time (Weinstein, 2011). These three are 
the core of the epistemological power of scientific theorizing seen as productive of 
emerging truth. The first, consilience, requires that theories are increasingly supported by 
a body of evidence that is improving in scope and detail. Breadth requires that a theory 
explains an increasing number of diverse phenomena, and depth requires that a theory is 
reinterpreted in terms of by higher-order explanatory frameworks that connect it to other 
theories of increasing breadth and increasing evidentiary adequacy.  My contention is 
given concrete expression in my model of emerging truth (MET), where warrants are 
afforded weights in relation to the growth of consilience, breadth and depth over time 
(Weinstein, 2009). When combined with an intuitive analysis of how these weights 
function dialectical and within available modifications of adaptive logic (Weinstein, 
2012), the MET offers a coherent account of dialectical advance in the face of changing 
evidence with clear consequences for understanding the logic of inquiry in science, for 
the theory of argument and for critical thinking (Weinstein, 2013).  
I see these epistemological characteristics to have been first exemplified by physical 
chemistry in the mid 1800’s. And despite a history of false starts, misleading empirical 
data and over-stated arguments, with the elaboration of the periodic table of elements in 
the 20th century, physical chemists were able to offer a unified and highly coherent body 
of branching explanatory structures, that ranges from micro-physics to cosmology, from 
the basic properties of matter to the complexity of the living cell (Sceri, 2007). 
Surprisingly, perhaps, this model has a clear connection with recent work in cognitive 
neuro-science that accounts for the prevalence of commitments in the face of counter-
evidence. For like physical chemistry, commitments are based, not merely on evidence, 
but the perspective that deep and connected generalizations of both fact and value play in 
determining which evidence to focus on, which evidence to remember, and which 
evidence to count as determinative of our beliefs and commitments. 
 
4. Cognitive science: 
 
Cognitive scientists, like early chemists had a basic theoretic perspective that permitted 
mathematical articulation (Weinstein, 2015).  Rather than look at behavior alone, cognitive 
scientists built models that accounted for the behavior in terms of functional models based on 
theoretic constructs (Gardner, 1987). This placed cognitive science in a position of indefinite 
growth. And the promise of increasingly sophisticated computer simulations of mind offered 
possibilities for the description of the complex theoretic structures put forward. Complex 
descriptions that require computer modeling for their articulation offers a test of consilience 
unlike anything in the prior history of psychology. Computer simulations of interactions 
employed theoretic constructs based on a vastly increased knowledge of the structure of the 
brain, available through powerful advances in instrumentation, brain scans of various sorts. This 
enabled the analysis of the range of cognitive behaviors.  
We do not know which theories in cognitive science are correct, but if they can be 
developed consistent with the available evidence they have the potential to grow in scope and 
detail as the theoretic predictions of ever-finer models of complex systems can be ascertained 
through computer simulations corresponding to the increasingly detailed experimental 
knowledge of the brain. That is, cognitive science shows potential for consilience. Like early 
physical chemistry, we don’t know which theories in cognitive science are true, but if a theory 
continues to yield important explanations, the potential for a growing and all-encompassing 
theoretic structure of psychology becomes plausible. 
In the history of physical chemistry, the increasing degree of articulation in the details that 
chemical theories explained, consilience, was combined with breadth, that is, with the scope of 
a theory. Cognitive science is, if nothing else, exceptionally broad in the scope of its concerns. 
The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science (Frankish & Ramsey, 2012) lists eight related 
research areas that reflect different aspects of cognition, including perception, action, learning 
and memory, reasoning and decision making, concepts, language, emotion and consciousness. 
In addition, they list four broad area that extend the reach of cognitive science from human 
cognition standardly construed to include animal cognition, evolutionary psychology, the 
relation of cognition to social entities and artifacts and most essential, the bridge between 
cognitive science and the rest of physical science: cognitive neuroscience. Each of these is a 
going concern, and none of them is free of difficulties. Yet in all cases there is a sense of 
advance, of wider and more thoughtful articulation of theoretical perspectives that address a 
growing range of cognitive concerns.  But as compelling as these characteristics are, it is depth 
that cognitive science shares with physical science, as both structures enable micro-explanation 
that can be seen to yield an over-arching ontology (Weinstein, 2002). 
The key to the epistemological power of cognitive science is its foundation in neuro-science. 
Speculations of instantiated neural mechanisms have systemic power much greater than their 
evidentiary weights. Such speculations offer an image of enormous potential warrant. For their 
enterprise, bridging between fundamental pre-cognitive processes such as physiological control 
and emotions to build the functional potential for memory and cognition offers deep structural 
warrants supported by reliable evidence and accepted theories. Moreover, their materialist 
assumptions permit a deep reduction to physiology, neurobiology, biochemistry and 
electrochemistry that any adequate theory of brain function must depend on. The question for us 
is what cognitive science has to offer to informal logicians in understanding the role of evidence 
and underling belief commitments in explaining the strength of argument and especially their 
resistance to, what seems to be the heart of rationality, the willingness to change in the face of 
counter-evidence. 
 
5: Cognition and Biasing Emotions: 
 
The connection between reasoning and emotions was postulated as early as Freud and 
continues to be an active area of research (academia.edu indicates over 100,000 papers on 
affective neuro-science.)  Research over decades indicates that our past associations affect our 
ability to alter our beliefs (Jacoby, et. al, 1989). A study of political beliefs showed resistance to 
argument that challenge our memories and commitments: “the persistence of misinformation 
might better be understood as characteristic of human thinking” (Lewandowsky et al., 2012, p. 
114). Much of the available research relevant to the role of emotions in cognition focuses on bias 
and stereotyping. For example, the studies of unacknowledged bias indicate “influence of 
implicit stereotypes on judgment and behavior.” (Blair, Ma, & Lenton 2001, p. 828). 
Unacknowledged, such attitudes may remain disconnected from a person's avowed beliefs: 
“Dissociations [between implicit and explicit attitudes] are commonly observed in attitudes 
toward stigmatized groups, including groups defined by race, age, ethnicity, disability, and 
sexual orientation.” (Greenwald & Krieger 2006, p. 949). Such implicit biases create emotional 
disturbance when in the face of social pressure such views are put into question. “When one 
denies a personal prejudice (explicit bias) that co-exists with underlying unconscious negative 
feelings and beliefs (implicit bias] leading to diffuse negative feelings of anxiety and 
uneasiness.” (Dovidio and Gaertner 2005, p. 42).  
There are neural mechanisms that account for such phenomena. The prefrontal cortex which 
processes conscious thought and the so-called “executive functions,” planning, goal setting, 
evaluation, and cognitive control is connected to other parts of the brain organizing input 
together into a coherent whole. Under the prefrontal cortex is the orbitofrontal cortex, which 
broadly supports self-regulation: physical, cognitive, emotional and social. These regions 
combine inputs to create the image of our physical body as well as perceptions of the external 
world and mental constructs (Dehaene, 2014). An interesting detail relevant for social cognition 
are so called “mirror neurons,” neurons that fire both when you act and when you perceive 
another performing the same action and which allow us to infer or predict others’ intentions 
(Iacoboni, et. al. 2005). Research indicates that mirroring of emotions, the degree of empathy we 
show others, is modifiable by real or perceived social relationships supporting ethnic or gender 
stereotypes (Amodio & Devine, 2006). There is evidence that biasing emotions reach deep into 
our biographies and are expressed in implicit biases. Evidence indicates that “early and affective 
experiences may influence automatic evaluations more than explicit attitudes. In addition, there 
is growing evidence that systemic, culturally held beliefs can bias people’s automatic 
evaluations” regardless of expressed personal opinions. (Rudman, 2004, p. 81). Childhood based 
biases cause strong reaction such as fear of unfamiliar others, which has been correlated with 
activation in the amygdala (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji 2008). Biases interfere, on a neural level, 
with the ability to experience others. When “European-American subjects looked at the face of 
another European-American, there was a larger neural response than when they looked at 
African-American faces (Lebrecht, et. al., 2009, p. 3). The result: “people do not mentally 
simulate the actions of [members of] outgroups. Their mirror-neuronsystems are less responsive 
to outgroup members than to ingroup members” (Gutsell and Inzlicht 2010, p. 844).  
Such results have been generalized in a theory of the “automaticity” of higher mental 
functions, which sees ordinary cognition as dependent on environmental and social factors 
(Bargh & Ferguson, 2000).  Evans (2008) in response to the then prevailing dual-processing 
model that distinguished between System 1 (unconscious/automatic/low effort) and System 2 
(conscious/explicit/high effort) offers a complex image of the interaction between what he terms 
unconscious and conscious cognition, seeing a variety of distinct and possibly incompatible 
systems. The work continues with the development of neural models that indicate the integration 
of cognition and emotion through abstract structures based on the known physiology of the brain.  
 
6. Models of the knowing brain: 
 
Speculations as to the neural mechanisms have systemic power much greater than their 
evidentiary weights. Although speculative and very likely inadequate, they offer an image of 
enormous potential warrant. For their enterprise, bridging between fundamental pre-cognitive 
processes such as physiological control and emotions to build the functional potential for 
memory and cognition, offers deep structural warrants supported by reliable evidence and 
accepted theories. Moreover, their materialist assumptions point to the deep reduction to 
physiology, neurobiology, biochemistry and electrochemistry that an adequate theory of brain 
function would depend on. This seems to me to parallel my account of the structure of scientific 
reasoning. As the models, indicated below, show, the brain coordinates functions across an 
array of inputs permitting an integrated response that enables perception, memory and purposes 
to bring together information necessary for coordinated action in the world. I see this as a clear 
parallel with consilience, the increasing systematic effectiveness across areas on concern as the 
sciences develop and new problems are confronted. Second the brain integrates the broad array 
of disparate information, proprioceptive, hormonal, electrical, and chemical, integrating new 
input with stored impute and modifying content in relation to newly acquired stimuli of many 
kinds. This seems to me parallel to breadth Most importantly, all of these functions are 
accounted for on increasingly defined more abstract levels, moving from gross physiological 
function to the operation at the cellular level, and if we accept materialism, to the molecular 
level, as we understand the functions of the neurological array on the deepest physiological 
levels. This has a clear parallel with depth, the reinterpretation of a theory in terms of a higher 
order, more abstract and more deeply ontological sense of the ultimate realties behind the 
phenomena.  And this is despite the enormous gap between the simple models of neurological 
activity proffered and the brute facts of the living brain: 30 billion neurons making countless 
trillions of connections and sensitive to a wide array of known biochemical agents, with more 
perhaps to come. We turn to two such accounts, the ambitious attempts of Thagard and Aubie, 
(2008) and Damasio (2010) to bridge the gap between abstract structure and available 
physiological knowledge.   
Thagard and Aubie draw upon both neurophysiology and computer modeling. This enables 
both theoretic depth and the possibility of increasing adequacy, even if the latter is no more that 
computer simulations of simplified cognitive tasks. They cite ANDREA, a model which 
“involves the interaction of at least seven major brain areas that contribute to evaluation of 
potential actions: the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex, the ventral striatum, midbrain dopaminergic neurons, and serotonergic neurons 
centered in the dorsal raphe nucleus of the brainstem” (Thagard and Aubie, 2008, p. 815). With 
ANDREA as the empirical basis, they construct EMOCON, which models emotional 
appraisals, based on a model of explanatory coherence, in terms of 5 key dimensions that 
determine responses: valance, intensity, change, integration and differentiation (pp. 816ff). 
EMOCON employs parallel constraint satisfaction based on a program, NECO, which provide 
elements needed to construct systems of artificial neural populations that can perform complex 
functions (p. 824ff. see pp. 831 ff. for the mathematical details). This points to the potential 
power of their approach. Computer models, even if gross simplifications, permit of ramping up. 
A logical basis with a clear mathematical articulation has enormous potential descriptive power 
as evidenced by the history of physical science. 
Damasio (2010) has a similarly ambitious program. He begins with the brain’s ability to 
monitor primordial states of the body, for example, the presence of chemical molecules 
(interoceptive), physiological awareness, such as the position of the limbs (proprioceptive), and 
the external world based on perceptual input (extroceptive). He construes this as the ability to 
construct maps and connects these functions with areas of the brain based on current research 
(pp. 74ff.). This becomes the basis for his association of maps with images defined in neural 
terms, which will ground his theory of the conscious brain.  
Given that much he gives an account of emotions elaborating on his earlier work, but now 
connecting emotions with perceived feelings. As with the association of maps and images, 
Damasio associates emotions with feeling and offers the following account: “Feeling of 
emotions are composite perceptions of (1) a particular state of the body, during actual or 
simulated emotion, and (2) a state of altered cognitive resources and the deployment of certain 
mental scripts” (p. 124). As before he draws upon available knowledge of the physiology of 
emotional states but the purpose of the discussion is not an account of emotions per se, but 
rather to ground the discussion of memory, which becomes the core of his attempt at a cognitive 
architecture (pp. 339ff.). The main task is to construct a system of information transfer within 
the brain and from the body to the brain. The model is, again, mediated by available 
physiological fact and theory about brain function and structure. The main theoretic construct in 
his discussion of memory is the postulation of ‘convergence-divergence zones’ (CDZs), which 
store ‘mental scripts’ (pp. 151ff.). Mental scripts are the basis of the core notion of stored 
‘dispositions,’ which he construes as ‘know-how’ that enables the ‘reconstruction of explicit 
representation when they are needed” (p. 150). Like maps (images) and emotions (feelings) 
memory requires the ability of parts of the brain to store procedures that reactivate prior internal 
states when triggered by other parts of the brain or states of the body. Dispositions, unlike 
images and feelings are unconscious, ‘abstract records of potentialities’ (p. 154) that enable 
retrieval of prior images, feelings and words through a process of reconstruction based in CDZs, 
what he calls ‘time-locked retroactivation’ (p. 155). CDZs form feedforward loops with, e.g. 
sensory information and feedback to the place of origination in accordance with coordinated 
input from other CDZs via convergence-divergence regions (CDRegions) by analogy with 
airport hubs (pp. 154ff.). Damasio indicates empirical evidence in primate brains for such 
regions and zones (p. 155) and offers examples of how the architecture works in understanding 
visual imagery and recall (pp. 158ff.).  
Damasio like Thagard and Aubie offer speculative models that reference current 
physiological knowledge, rely on concepts from computer science and information theory and 
bypass the deep philosophical issues that are seen by many to create an unbridgeable gap 
between the mental and the physical short of deep metaphysical reorientation (Chalmers, 1996). 
Yet, whatever the ultimate verdict on these two authors, the rich program in cognitive science 
persists and has a strong appeal. The reason is the potential strength of the warrants, that is to 
say, if such models prove to be correct, the epistemic force of the warrants that support them 
will be enormous, for they are presumptively warrants with increasing consilience and breadth, 
and most importantly warrants that have great ontologically depth. And thus, they are warrants 
that swamp the alternative approaches that rely on, for example, psychological generalizations 
alone. 
 
6: Conclusion 
 
If my analysis is at all correct, the consequences for informal logic in both theory and 
practice are significant. For, if as I maintain, arguments both in successful areas of inquiry like 
physical chemistry and on a neural level, have a similar functional structure, then informal 
logicians should alter their analysis of argument structure in relevant ways. Most obviously the 
model of argument as a structure whose form offers an indication of its adequacy must be 
expanded. Argument must move from structure to the functions the structures exemplify, and in 
particular, the function of warrants that reflect the underlying networks of commitments in 
directing and sustaining argument. This requires more than a complication of argument 
diagramming, but rather a movement into the detail of support. How commitments to warrants 
and the networks of beliefs that they represent alter the evaluation of evidence, both evidence 
sought and evidence already available. As important, the hard and fast distinction between fact 
and value needs to be overcome, especially in areas of social significance, for values affect the 
way we look at fact. The gloss of value as emotions, is not the main concern, it is rather the 
affect-laden nature of our values that must be taken into account, for the force of values in 
making determinations of fact used as evidence are all too often more powerful than the force of 
facts alone. How does the value of individual freedom as compared to the value of lives 
possibly at risk, determine the gun debate? How does the religious perspectives on the meaning 
of life affect views of a women’s right to control her reproductive choices? How does a 
commitment to a political party affect our willingness to believe hyperbolic claims and 
promises? On and on! It is the network of commitments of all sorts that determine the force of 
arguments and if logicians want to get serious about evaluating arguments, it is these underlying 
networks that must be addressed. 
As severe as my view is for theory, it is even more severe for practice. I have no doubt that 
an introductory course in informal logic or critical thinking has some effect on students' 
perspectives. Any new way of looking at the world can have a profound effect on college–age 
students. So, anecdotes about the effectiveness of such courses by their professors are quite 
beside the point. Rather, the introduction to argument and logic must point students towards 
critical attitudes in their other courses of studies and to the world that such studies reflect upon. 
What a doctoral student of mine, Daniel Fisherman, calls, 'perceived questionability,’ the 
attitude that prompts a questioning perspective towards areas of concern (Fisherman, 2013). 
This is close to the much-maligned views of John McPeck, whose idea of reflective skepticism 
was all too readily disregarded in the heydays of the critical thinking movement (McPeck, 
1981). McPeck, like myself, sees critical thinking to ultimately reside in the areas of human 
concern, what many have called the disciplines. And like McPeck, I see informal logicians to 
have to go into the ‘weeds’ of an argument, to look at the details of the supporting warrants that 
connect the concepts that are at issue. And that is not even to engage with the more difficult 
terrain of backing, in my gloss on Toulmin, the deep theoretic reinterpretation of warrants in 
terms of deeper and more theoretically laden perspectives: worldviews and standpoints 
(Weinstein, 2006). 
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